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I. Abstract 
This chapter reviews some findings in cognition sciences and examines their consequences 
for the analysis of institutions. It starts by exploring how humans’ specialization in producing 
knowledge ensures our success in dominating the environment but also changes fast our 
environment. So fast that it did not give time to natural selection to adapt our biology, causing it 
to be potentially maladapted in important dimensions. A main function of institutions is therefore 
to fill the gap between the demands of our relatively new environment and our biology, still 
adapted to our ancestral environment as hunter-gatherers. Moreover, institutions are built with 
the available elements, which include our instincts. A deeper understanding of both aspects, their 
adaptive function and this recruitment of ancestral instincts, will add greatly to our ability to 
manage institutions.  
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II. Introduction 
The human mind was mainly designed in a competitive process of natural genetic selection, 
which is characterized by random genetic mutation, producing new traits, and cumulative 
selection of those traits that allow individuals who carry them to survive and reproduce more. 
Natural selection thus acts as a chief design engineer, even if other forces, such as sexual 
selection, path dependency and simple noise, are also present. We see well now only because a 
long series of mutations triggered redesigns which permitted our ancestors’ sight to improve. The 
same happens with our mental processes, even those considered more rational, involved in 
making decisions and interacting socially.  
Modern cognition sciences perform a sort of “reverse engineering” of these mental processes. 
Their findings may trigger a scientific revolution of Copernican proportions in the social 
sciences and in any case require a full reconsideration of standard assumptions about human 
behavior, related to both rationality and cooperation.  
This chapter reviews some of these findings and examines some of their consequences for the 
analysis of institutions and organizations. We start by exploring the consequences of our 
specialization in producing knowledge, which are twofold: it has ensured our success in 
dominating the environment but has also changed the environment very fast and radically. This 
change occurred so fast that it did not allow time for natural selection to adapt our biology, 
causing us to be maladapted in important dimensions. To adapt, we therefore need the artifacts 
we call institutions. A new view of institutions thus emerges, which sees their function as that of 
filling the gap between our biology, which is still adapted to our ancestral environment as hunter-
gatherers, and the demands of our relatively new environment.  
The development of institutions therefore facilitates cooperative transactions which seem to 
rely less on our instinctual psychology and more on artificially designed structures of 
enforcement. These artificial systems rely on instincts, however, as they recruit them for 
performing new functions within the institutional arrangement.   
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Consequently, cooperation is not only grounded on a calculation of costs and benefits, as it is 
sometimes assumed in utility maximizing models of human behavior. Automatic mechanisms, 
evolved in ancestral environments, play essential roles, and their functioning has to be 
understood for wisely structuring our artificial enforcement systems (including those of firms), 
as well as for using our calculative rationality successfully when we interact with other 
individuals.  
This emphasis on instincts ties in with classic and institutional economics. For instance, 
Adam Smith saw humans as essentially instinctive (Coase, 1976) and he correctly understood 
that instincts (that is, his “sentiments”) are adaptive and, under normal circumstances, make no 
mistake. This is why affairs of survival importance, such as self-preservation and reproduction, 
are not “entrusted to the slow and uncertain determinations of our reason” but to “original and 
immediate instincts” (Smith, 1759, II, iii). Instinctive Darwinian psychology was also important 
for institutional analysts, such as Veblen (Hodgson, 2004a and 2004b), because they saw habits 
as the basis of human behavior, and habits are close to current views of the mind, based on 
modules and heuristics.  
This chapter will proceed in four stages. First, it will examine how the specialization of 
human beings in cognition leads to a modular design of the human mind and how it grants both 
biological success and maladaptation. Next, it will explore the consequences of this view, in 
terms of modular instincts and environmental maladaptation, for the two key behavioral 
assumptions, those of rationality and cooperation. Then it will explain how institutions allow us 
to fill the gap in our innate maladaptation, a job for which institutions often recruit instincts 
originally designed for other purposes. A final section concludes.  
III. Consequences of our cognitive specialization 
III.A. Human beings are specialists in the cognitive niche 
We are not very good at flying but we do build planes that fly faster than any animal. Already 
in ancestral times, we were the best predators: thanks to our hunting technologies, both physical  
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and social, we were able to hunt animals that were too big to be hunted by any other predator. 
We achieved it all by becoming knowledge specialists, by entering the “cognitive niche” (Tooby 
and De Vore, 1987), and developing increasingly sophisticated tools, with which we have 
radically changed our environment.  
This specialization in cognition and technology constrains our design but also explains our 
dominant position in nature. Our design is constrained to have certain physiological and social 
constraints that make brain development possible, and, most importantly, to have a modular 
mind instead of a general processing mind. Cognitive specialization also brought about a 
substantial comparative advantage over our animal prey and competitors, with the side 
consequence that we also became maladapted to the rapid changes we cause in our own 
environment.  
III.B. Modular design 
Firstly, an intelligent mind has to be produced and has to function economically, because 
brains are very costly to operate: our brain weighs only 2% of our total body weight but it spends 
around 20% of our energy. To be efficient, cognitive specialization requires a certain degree of 
modularity in the internal workings of our mind, as any other complex system (Simon, 1962). 
Otherwise, a general-purpose mind would have to use the same methods and tools for different 
problems which present different information structures. In contrast, specialized modules make it 
possible to optimize the use of the information available in the environment. With this 
specialization, the mind contains mechanisms that are, in a sense, “better than rational” because 
they minimize the use of information, speed up decisions and produce sophisticated solutions 
(Cosmides and Tooby, 1994). We will see below that instincts provide speedy optimal solutions 
without conscious rational thinking and emotions even achieve optimal strategic self-
commitment by suspending rationality.  
III.C. Success—and maladaptation 
Second, intelligence confers on human beings a huge comparative advantage over most other 
animals, because we are able to develop new technologies, including weapons and hunting  
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techniques, faster than our prey and competitors can evolve defenses against them, given that 
they develop them only by natural selection. We therefore become dominant and much of our 
prey tends to go extinct, as shown by the now abundant record that we exterminated big animals 
each time we first arrived on a continent.  
However, our cognitive specialization has the paradoxical consequence that we outrun not 
only our prey but also ourselves. In the last ten thousand years (an instant for natural selection), 
we have also changed our own environment far faster than our own genetics could adapt to such 
change. Natural selection is powerful but slow, requiring thousands of generations. The human 
brain thus evolved under the selective pressures faced by our ancestors in the ancestral 
“environment of evolutionary adaptedness” of the Pleistocene period (1.8 million to ten thousand 
years ago), the only interval long enough to allow significant genetic adaptation.  
Our mind is therefore designed to cope with the problems relevant for survival and 
reproduction at that remote time—those of habitat selection, foraging, social exchange, 
competition from others, contagion avoidance, and sexual rivalry. Our mental hardware is fine-
tuned to live in small nomadic tribes, hunting and gathering fruits, in a world with few 
technologies—just fire as well as stone and wood tools, and little interaction and trade outside 
the group.  
In a manner consistent with our cognitive specialization, the solution for this maladaptation 
has also been technological: we use institutional “technologies” to improve our fitness. The 
function of institutions is therefore to enhance our capacity to reason and interact, allowing us to 
overcome our own evolutionary constraints, mainly through self and social control.  
IV. Rationality 
When engineers started to design mechanical robots, they soon realized that seemingly 
simple tasks, such as recognizing objects, are instead tremendously complex, and achievements 
in such tasks have been slow. Computers are now very good at using mathematical and logical 
rules, and one of them even beats the world chess champion. At the same time, experimental 
psychologists have shown that human beings err systematically in simple logical problems and  
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poorly assess the probability of individual events. Why is our mind so powerful and at the same 
time so limited? Why do bumblebees perform better than most humans at probabilistic 
induction? The answer is simple. Our mind is powerful but economical in the use of resources. It 
spends resources in solving problems that were relevant for survival in our evolutionary past, but 
it does not care about those which were irrelevant.  
Make no mistake. The human mind is very powerful indeed. It routinely, even effortlessly, 
manages to solve the most difficult problems: those without solution, such as identifying the 
factors in a product—so-called “ill-posed” problems. It is so powerful that we are better than 
rational on evolutionary recurrent tasks, such as recognizing objects, acquiring grammar, or 
comprehending speech. Robot designers soon realized how difficult it was to endow their 
creatures with the crudest rudiments of sight or walking. After several decades of research, even 
purposely-designed robots are only able to walk clumsily, or to identify only the set of forms that 
they have been programmed to “see.” 
But our mind is also economical, meaning that it uses only those resources required to 
succeed in a given environment. Our mind does not produce “scientific” solutions, with general 
validity, but solutions which are good enough to master the local environment. Our rationality is 
bounded not only because it is subject to constraints, but because it is developed and adapted to 
certain environments: it is ecological, meaning that it is adapted, first, to our common ancestral 
environment of evolutionary adaptation and, second, to our learning environment, probably with 
much more malleable consequences.2  
Many observed decisional “failures” in the artificial environments of experimental 
psychology and economics may therefore be a consequence of its artificiality, its absence in the 
natural environment. For example, humans “fail” when applying probability theory. For instance, 
we fall prey to the “gambler’s fallacy,” feeling that, for example, lottery numbers with all their 
digits repeated (e.g., 33333) have a lower probability of winning than numbers with variable 
                                                 
2 The idea that individuals (and organizations) decide by using heuristics which work relatively 
well in a given environment, be it natural or social, was proposed by Simon (1956). Reference to 
“ecological rationality” is found in Tooby and Cosmides (1992). See also Gigerenzer and Todd 
(1999), who stress how the mind makes efficient use of the structure of information available in 
the environment and Smith (2003) for a view from experimental economics.   
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digits (53487). But it might well be the case that our mind is adapted to environments in which 
very few events are independent and most variables are correlated. In nature, very few successes 
are independent and it is unclear how many there are in the current world, perhaps with the 
exception of some casinos and stockmarkets. Independence is often open to question. After an 
aircraft crash, most people are more afraid to fly. That would not make sense if aircraft crashes 
were independent events, but are they really independent?   
Similarly, our mind seems to have developed an ability to process probabilities in terms of 
relative frequencies in the long term, not as numbers expressing confidence in a single event. 
This explains that, when probabilities are presented as frequencies (“one out of one hundred is 
sick”) instead of single events (“probability that John is sick”), people are much more accurate. 
This “frequentionist” view of the mind somehow dilutes the claims about several alleged biases 
and fallacies, such as the overconfidence bias, conjunction fallacy, and base-rate neglect.3  
IV.A. Instinctive rationality 
During the last few centuries, we have become accustomed to separate reason and emotions, 
also considering emotions as inferior to reason. This Cartesian separation of emotions and reason 
is seriously flawed, however. Our mind relies on instinctive mechanisms, including emotions, to 
solve the most relevant problems, those on whose correct solution hinged our survival and 
reproduction. Furthermore, emotions are a necessary ingredient of rationality: ill people who 
have lost part of their frontal lobe are “perfectly rational” but their loss of emotions seems to 
damage their decision-making capacities. They are often incapable of deciding and, instead, keep 
evaluating advantages and disadvantages without ever reaching a conclusion (Damasio, 1994). 
The adaptive consequences of emotions are obvious in simple ones, such as hunger, which 
moves us to search for food, and the pleasure of eating, which leads us to accumulate reserves in 
our bodies. Furthermore, emotions are often adaptive even when they seem to harm the 
individual, and tend, therefore, to be considered “irrational.” For example, having a hot temper 
                                                 
3 See Gigerenzer (2000), whose work has been criticized, however, both in terms of its results 
(e.g., Kleither et al., 1997) and for distorting the position of the “biases and fallacies” paradigm 
(Markoczy and Goldberg, 1998, 400-402).   
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that leads us to react violently to even minor offenses may have a deterrent effect which helps 
such person in a lawless context.  
More complex emotions also have adaptive value. For instance, happiness mobilizes 
resources to fit in our environment and to reproduce. The paradoxes of happiness may be 
explained from this perspective. First, we feel happy when we observe that our relative position 
is good. This seems silly but it is not, because relative positions inform us about which level of 
achievement we should be aiming for. Second, in determining the degree of happiness, we give 
greater importance to changes than to levels of achievement. This emphasis on changes renews 
our motivation to strive in the search for happiness and, therefore, environmental fitness—both 
people who win a lottery or whom suffer misfortune adapt fast to their new situation. Third, we 
feel more negative than positive emotions and we tend to grant greater weight to losses than to 
gains. This asymmetric feeling may also be adaptive because the consequences of losses and 
gains are intrinsically asymmetric, given that losses threaten survival while gains do not increase 
reproductive success in an equivalent proportion. There are, in a sense, diminishing returns to 
wealth in generating fitness.  
IV.B. Ecological rationality: the maladaptation of our instincts  
There are many examples of emotions that not longer seem well adapted, however. For 
instance, our feeding emotions were probably useful in our ancestral set-up, characterized by 
unreliable food supply, but are badly adapted for wealthy societies. Consequently, we now need 
to spend resources and develop self-controlling mechanisms to avoid dying earlier from 
overeating. Without self-control, we tend to eat too much, especially sugar, fat and salt. A taste 
for sweetness motivated our ancestors to eat fruits but it became maladapted when we recently 
developed sugar and candy, transforming the taste for sweetness into a damaging sweet tooth.  
Let us examine two prominent examples of emotional maladaptation with vast economic 
consequences: risk aversion and weakness of will.   
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Risk aversion 
As any other essential trait of human beings, risk aversion probably has an innate component, 
as shown by the presence of a certain asymmetry of gains and losses and perhaps even excessive 
risk aversion.  
Evolutionary optimal preferences about risk should be adapted to the ancestral environment 
in which people were living on the edge of subsistence. Under such dire straits it makes sense to 
evolve risk aversion preferences, especially toward losses, and this may be behind some forms of 
asymmetry which have been observed in experiments. Our current environment is less uncertain 
and its optimal rate of risk aversion may well be lower. However, natural selection is too slow to 
catch up with fast environmental change. Therefore, instinctive risk aversion may be leading 
modern humans to excessive prudence. We are risk averse to avoid risks that we are programmed 
to (wrongly) perceive as affecting our survival and reproduction. 
Weakness of will 
Most human beings suffer difficulties identifying what they want and being consistent about 
it. This may be a natural consequence of at least two factors: conflict between mental modules 
and maladapted discounting.  
The modularity internal to the human mind causes a typical trade-off between specialization 
gains and transaction costs. Developing specialized mental mechanisms to solve different 
problems might incur substantial transaction costs that will take the form of discrepancies and 
conflicts between these specialized modules, as each one optimizes the allocation of scarce 
resources toward a different goal. In addition, it would be too costly to eliminate these 
transaction costs, achieving a perfect fit between the aggregation of locally optimal partial 
solutions reached by different modules and the optimum for the whole. Current knowledge on 
consciousness is too weak to reach a definite conclusion,4 but the existence of internal mental 
conflict is supported by biological evidence on apparently awkward conflicts, as those between 
                                                 
4 For some, it is clear that no part of the brain decides, as mental “supervisors” fail systematically 
and suffer self-deception. Self control is therefore claimed to be merely a sort of “spin doctor,” 
an illusion (Pinker, 2002, 42-43). For a more nuanced view, see Ramachandran (2004).   
  10
cells and organs within a body as well as those between a pregnant mother and the fetus in her 
womb.  
Daily life is also full of instances in which we make inconsistent decisions over time, from 
the difficulties of following a diet or quitting smoking, to the tricks we use to get out of bed in 
the morning or to study regularly. These weaknesses of will may emerge because of 
maladaptation to our current environment, which is substantially less risky than our ancestral 
environment and therefore makes it optimal to postpone gratification whilst we have evolved to 
emphasize present consumption. Let us see why.  
Human beings constantly allocate scarce recourses over time through saving and investment 
decisions which confront present against future consumption, decisions which are driven by both 
reason and emotions. Evolution has also developed automatic mechanisms to cope with this 
allocation problem and to maximize the chances of reproduction. It is also likely that innate traits 
have evolved for decision making, a sort of “subjective discount rate,” finely tuned to our 
expected longevity and the level of risk in our environment, and both affecting and embedded in 
our emotions.5  
It is likely that such innate discount rate is too high for our current stable environment and 
long life. Risks were much greater in the ancestral past, because of lesser control on nature and 
the prevalence of warfare. Therefore, life expectancy was very short and, in accordance with 
such circumstances, we probably evolved a high subjective discount rate which ceased to be 
optimal when, quite recently, we achieved a safer environment.  
This may explain that we now need artificial technologies of self-control to be able to 
postpone gratification and better adapt to our environment. For instance, it is clear that much of 
our educational effort is directed to change children’s preferences in order to postpone 
gratification, inculcating them with a lower discount rate. This cultural lowering of the subjective 
discount rate is most noticeable when lacking: many children raised in broken families and 
ghettos easily fall prey of drug addiction and all kind of short-sighted behavior.   
                                                 
5 In fact, the brain’s response to short term opportunities is mostly emotional, taking place in the 
limbic system, while long term rewards are governed by reason and calculation, triggering brain 
activity in the prefrontal cortex (McClure et al., 2004).    
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V. Cooperation 
Specialization increases productivity but requires cooperation, and is often costly to achieve. 
Only in the less-interesting cases do cooperation benefits come at no cost to cooperators. 
Symbiotic interaction is the paradigm of this sort of costless and non-conflictive cooperation. It 
explains, for example, why some animals live together in amorphous shoals or herds in order to 
be better protected from predators. When we trade simple commodities in the spot market we are 
also close to such ideal of mutuality.  
The most interesting cases of cooperation, however, are those in which cooperation benefits 
involve substantial costs for cooperating parties. Their interaction is therefore prone to conflicts 
of interests, as each cooperator tries to reap the benefits of cooperation without paying the 
corresponding share of the costs. In such cases, cooperation requires enforcement mechanisms to 
make sure that parties comply.  
This enforcement is produced by different means, which rely more or less heavily on innate 
instincts. The most simple of these instincts are linked to genetic relatedness, which grounds 
cooperation between relatives. The most complex are those instincts supporting cooperation 
between genetically unrelated individuals. They play a role even for achieving cooperation 
between total strangers.  
Let us examine some elements of this arsenal of cooperative instincts, how they work and to 
what extent they are maladapted.  
V.A. Instinctive cooperation 
Genetic relatedness 
By helping their children, parents promote the survival of their own genes. More precisely, 
genes driving parents to help their children had a better chance of survival and became dominant. 
This explains why humans in all cultures are benevolent toward their own descendants and  
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relatives, the more so the greater their genetic relatedness, leading to nepotism, which has been 
shown to be universal.6  
The common practice of taking the family as a rhetorical model when we want to emphasize 
cooperation suggests that genetic relatedness is effective. Managers, for example, claim that “our 
firm is a family,” and believers of many faiths treat co-believers as brothers and sisters, and 
priest as fathers. In addition, genetic relatedness does not require external enforcement, because 
parties are preprogrammed to cooperate. On the negative side, however, it motivates rent seeking 
in the form of cuckoldry and correspondingly, spending resources to avoid it. Furthermore, 
nepotism often conflicts with “higher” forms of cooperation, which explains that, despite being 
universally present, the most developed cultures try to repress it. In addition, cooperation 
grounded on genetic relatedness is limited to a few individuals, and, as a consequence, it does 
not allow much specialization.  
Emotional commitment  
Genetic relatedness is only the tip of the iceberg of cooperative instincts. Even strangers 
playing standard non-repetitive cooperation games cooperate more than pure logic predicts, 
especially when they are allowed to talk with the other players (for example, Valley et al. 2002). 
It seems that we are able to evaluate, detect, or link emotionally to our mates, and this allows us 
to overcome part of the cooperative dilemma we are facing.  
The implementation of these detection and reciprocity strategies requires a sophisticated 
mind, which has to be capable of, at least, forming cooperative initial expectations, foreseeing 
future interactions, distinguishing cheating from cooperative behavior by partners and keeping a 
record of past interactions. Human minds are equipped with tools designed for overcoming these 
problems because they were important in our evolutionary past.  
The simplest evidence on the existence of these instincts comes from the physiological 
consequences of insincerity: blushing often follows lying, and most people cannot avoid showing 
their feelings. This explains why business travel continues being important in these times of the 
                                                 
6 These ideas of “kin selection” or “inclusive fitness” were developed by Williams and Williams 
(1957); Hamilton (1963, 1964); and Maynard Smith (1964). Brown (1991) points out the 
universal presence of nepotism.  
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internet and teleconference, as people have difficulty in evaluating trustworthiness by telephone 
or e-mail.  
These cooperative tools, from the relative simple, such as facial expressions, to the most 
sophisticated, such as love, are instinctive and not calculative because it would be inefficient to 
solve most of these cooperation problems by rational calculation, using a general-purpose mental 
process. Couples rely on love and attachment to safeguard their cooperation. In a similar way, 
criminals ground their cooperation on their urge to defend their reputation and territory, which 
leads them to costly and seemingly irrational fights and revenges. Emotions thus provide 
solutions that “better than rational” when they commit individuals to a certain behavior which is 
optimal in the long term.  
Emotional responses often seem irrational and maladaptive, as when we die to save a loved 
one or to punish an enemy. However, these emotions are part of an efficient commitment 
strategy. If he is willing to die for her, she will be much more willing to take him as a partner. If 
a criminal retaliates all offenses, he will deter potential offenders. The problem of both, lovers 
and criminals, is to make their disposition credible, as, after the fact, it would pay to change their 
minds and avoid his giving up his life or inflicting a costly punishment. Being emotionally 
driven provides this credibility. He falls in love so much that when faced with the situation of 
risking his life he does not calculate costs and benefits. He simply cannot help but throwing 
himself to save her. The criminal’s rage and urge for revenge may play a similar role. For both, 
their emotional responses will occasionally seem inefficient when they are activated, but this 
apparent inefficiency is hiding that such instances of activation make it possible achieving 
greater efficiency in many other cases. In a sense, ex post “irrational” emotions are introducing 
greater ex ante rationality.  
The tools of reciprocity 
The human brain is also well endowed to distinguish cooperators from cheats among 
potential partners and to distinguish cooperative from cheating behavior. Think that, to be 
fruitful, emotional commitment requires that prospective parties are able to distinguish 
cooperative individuals from cheats beforehand. Similarly, reciprocity, which is probably the  
  14
basis of most cooperation in modern societies,7 also requires that participants be able to 
distinguish at least compliant from cheating behavior after the transaction. For instance, playing 
even the simplest reciprocity strategy, such as “tit-for-tat,”8 requires us to distinguish cooperative 
from cheating behavior a posteriori.  
Both abilities, detecting cheats ex ante and ex post, are related and have to cope with the 
possibility of error and mimicry: those who read a cooperative move as cheating when playing tit 
for tat are inviting retaliation on themselves; those who take a cheat for a cooperator will get the 
worst of their association. Understandably, human beings seem to have developed specialized 
innate abilities to detect cheating behavior, as well as to signal and distinguish cooperators, 
which make it possible for human populations to reach stable polymorphic equilibria with 
different types—for instance, cooperators, reciprocators and cheats.9 Some biologists have even 
argued that our brains develop in the “arms’ race” of deception and detection. In sum, reciprocity 
is grounded on complex mental tools of detection and commitment. Two of these tools are our 
ability to detect cheats and our urge to retaliate when we feel that we have been cheated.  
Cheating detectors 
The presence of mental resources specialized in detecting cheats has been shown by an 
adaptation of the Wason psychological tests by Leda Cosmides (1985, 1989; Cosmides and 
Tooby, 1992). The original test measures humans’ logic ability by trying to find out how good 
we are at falsifying hypotheses. For example, a set of four cards with letters on one side and 
numbers on the other, such as  
 D    F    3    7    
                                                 
7 Main ideas on what is often labeled “reciprocal altruism” were developed by Williams (1966), 
Trivers (1971, 1985) and Alexander (1987). Reciprocity has been shown to be a human 
universal, with similar results being obtained in experiments run in different cultures and greater 
cooperation observed in societies in which people rely more on market exchanges in their daily 
lives (Henrich et al., 2001, 2005). 
8 Tit-for-tat consists of cooperating in the initial round and replicating in other rounds the 
conduct of the other player in the preceding round.  
9 See Maynard Smith y Price (1973) and Frank (1987), and, for a recent empirical test, Kurzban 
and House (2005).   
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is shown to a sample of individuals who are then said to test the rule “If a card has a D on one 
side, it must have a 3 on the other” by turning over as fewer cards as possible. It results that only 
between 5% and 15% of people get it right (D and 7 in this example).10  
However, as shown by Cosmides, the same task becomes much easier if it is expressed in 
terms of contractual exchange, when finding a false is equivalent to detecting a cheat. Imagine, 
for example, that you are enforcing the rule “If a person is drinking beer, he must be 18 or older” 
by checking either their drink or their age.  
 Beer drinker    Coke drinker    25 year old    16 year old    
In this case most people get it right (checking the beer drinker and the 16 year old) despite 
the fact that the logical structure of the problem is exactly the same than before. Furthermore, the 
improvement in solving the puzzle is not caused by the concreteness of the story because most 
people also fail when it is told in a concrete setup without a cheating element. For example, 
falsifying the rule “If a person eats hot chili peppers (HCP), then he must drink cold beer” where 
SCP represents sweet chili peppers, is not easier than the example with the abstract cards DF37.  
 Eats HCP    Eats SCP    Drinks beer    Drinks Coke    
In conclusion, it seems that our ability to obtain the right solution is higher in a cheating 
situation thanks to our use of mental resources which work faster and better than when 
processing the abstract rules of logic. 
Strong reciprocity 
Reciprocity seems well suited for repeated interaction but experiments also show that 
humans often practice a strong form of reciprocity that is well suited to one-shot transactions: we 
are willing to incur costs to punish cheats even when there is no prospect of further interaction. 
                                                 
10 The card with a D is informative, because if there was not a 3 the rule would be falsified. The 
card with a 7 is also informative, because if there was a D the rule would be falsified. The card 
with an F is not informative, because, whatever the number on the other side, it would comply 
with the rule. The card with a 3 is not informative either because the rule does not forbid having 
a 3 and any other letter.  
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Interestingly, this propensity to punish ends up achieving greater cooperation, when parties 
anticipate the possibility of costly retaliation.  
Both results have been proved in many experiments (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In those with 
an “ultimatum” game, an individual, A, divides 1000 € between himself and B, but none of them 
gets a cent if B rejects the offer. Usually, the distributor A divides by half and, interestingly, B 
rejects offers below 30%, even for stakes of as much as three months’ earnings. Given that 
distributors are less generous when B cannot reject and A acts as a dictator, it seems that the 
expectation of B’s rejection helps in eliciting generous offers. 
The psychology of retaliation is also revealed in experiments that test our reactions in “public 
good” games. In these, a number of people contribute money to a common pool, expecting to be 
compensated later with an equal share in a multiple of the pool. In one-stage games, people often 
contribute half their wealth. In multiple stages, however, people start contributing more but their 
contributions decay with time and approach zero at the end. This fall is not driven by learning 
but likely by the fact that, in the experiment, the only punishment cooperators can inflict on free 
riders is by cheating themselves. Remarkably, when the game is redefined so that cooperators 
can punish free riding even at a cost and without prospect of future interaction (“strong 
reciprocity”), they do punish them, and this increases cooperation. Therefore, depending on 
circumstances, either cheats lead cooperators who are incapable of retaliation to cheat, or 
cooperators who are willing to incur costly retaliation lead cheats to cooperate.  
V.B. Ecological cooperation: the maladaptation of our instincts 
Whatever the power of cooperative instincts, their adaptation to the hunter-gatherer 
environment of our ancestors means that they may be maladapted to the cooperative demands of 
our current environment. We will now comment on the limits of cooperation grounded on 
cooperative instincts to examine, next, how these limits constrain the characteristic form of 
modern cooperation—that taking place through market exchange.  
The limits of instinctive cooperation 
Cooperative instincts are powerful but limited to certain forms of cooperation, mainly within 
small groups of known people. These limits are most prominent for genetic relatedness, which  
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promotes cooperation only among relatives, but other mechanisms have also their particular, 
even if less strict, limits. Thus, most emotional commitment and cheating detectors require 
personal interaction. Direct reciprocity is also limited to relatively small groups because it 
requires us to know others and to keep track of their behavior.  
We now live in large groups, with anonymous and more impersonal, indirect and superficial 
interactions. In part, we rely on direct reciprocity. For example, brand managers are well aware 
that consumers have a personal and emotionally loaded relationship with the brands that they 
consume. We rely more, however, on mechanisms of indirect reciprocity. In the market, for 
example, we reward a merchant who rewards another merchant and so on, until, after several 
more steps, a manufacturer is rewarded for producing a good product. But not only in the market 
place. The legal order is grounded on indirect reciprocity by the use of third party (mainly, 
judicial) enforcement.  
The unnaturalness of market exchange 
Most of these mechanisms of indirect reciprocity are institutional. They are designed to 
promote a certain type of exchange for which we are poorly endowed by nature, for example 
trade between anonymous parties. The design and difficulties of such institutions are often 
connected to this intrinsic maladaptation.  
This reasoning is especially applicable to markets. Market dealings may suffer all sorts of 
problems and therefore require substantial institutional support. Given that, in the evolutionary 
timescale, at least some forms of market exchange are very new, they are prone to conflict with 
our instincts.11 Several types of conflict appear when considering that these instincts, well 
adapted to the economic environment of our hunter-gatherer ancestors, will tend to bias us 
against anonymous parties and at least certain forms of trade, insurance and capital, including 
wealth accumulation and credit:  
                                                 
11 This argument provides a common and more solid ground to the pioneering and rival 
arguments by Polanyi (1944) on the limits of market-type relations and the resistance of societies 
to the dominance of such relations; and Hayek (1944) on the opposing rules of the “extended 
order of cooperation through markets” and the more intimate and personal order. The danger that 
the primitive collectivistic leanings of human beings pose to the market has also been stressed by 
Smith (2003) from the perspective of experimental economics.   
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Our hunter gatherer grandparents lived in small bands of no more than 100 or 150 
individuals, which limited social interaction and economic specialization, as most interactions 
were with identifiable people who you know personally. A bias against unknown, anonymous, 
people likely developed as a consequence12. In addition, the value added by those making 
indirect trade possible (intermediaries) and abstract forms of trade (e.g., in services, intangibles 
or capital) may be more difficult to grasp. Furthermore, warfare among bands was prevalent, 
much more so than in modern societies (Keeley, 1996), which throws doubt as to how much are 
we naturally endowed to gain through production and trade or, instead, to expropriate strangers 
through violence.  
With respect to distribution, hunter-gatherers distributed their production following a mixed 
pattern of sharing and private appropriation. This agreed with economic logic, as they shared 
resources (big game) as insurance against exogenous risks and privately appropriated those 
resources (fruits) whose production would have suffered the most from the perverse incentives 
caused by sharing (Cashdan, 1980; Kaplan and Hill, 1985; Bailey, 1992). This predisposition to 
compensate exogenous risks now likely poses systematic problems to insurance markets. Given 
that human societies are predisposed to compensate bad luck ex post, it does not make sense to 
buy insurance ex ante. The argument can be applied widely in all sorts of insurance, from farm 
production to earthquakes or, most importantly, healthcare; and also provides support for welfare 
states. 
Lastly, the ancestral situation with respect to capital and technology also holds important 
consequences. First, the need of mobility meant that our ancestors only accumulated portable 
capital. This may have hindered our ability to understand the productivity of capital and the basis 
for paying interest. Second, technical change was extremely slow, causing a practical absence of 
economic growth (Kremer, 1993). This may have predisposed humans against inequality and 
even wealth because, in the absence of growth, the economy becomes a zero-sum game and 
individual inequality and wealth are more likely to proceed from expropriation than from 
socially productive activities.  
                                                 
12 Excessive attention therefore may be paid now to identifiable individuals, to the detriment of 
anonymous parties by both the political process (Rubin, 2002, 153-181) and judges (Arruñada 
and Andonova, forthcoming).   
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VI. The Role of Institutions 
Against this background, institutions act as rationalizing and cooperative mechanisms that 
enhance our fitness in new environments. They are, however, grounded on our human nature: in 
a sense they “recruit” and mold our instincts to build more effective mechanisms. We will briefly 
examine this recruitment process, to focus on the role of institutions.  
VI.A. Instincts as building blocks of institutions 
Natural selection has often recruited body organs to perform functions different from the 
ones that they were originally designed to do. For example, our limbs were developed starting 
from the swimming fins of our fish ancestors. Similarly, institutions recruit instincts as building 
blocks of their machinery, often to create enforcement mechanisms. A simple case is that of 
disgust, an emotion that was originally useful to avoid poisoning, an important risk for 
omnivorous animals. For example, food taboos (e.g., against eating pork) seem to be exploiting 
the psychology of disgust during the period when children learn their food preferences, probably 
to make for them more difficult to interact with members of neighboring groups when they are 
grown up. These cultural taboos show enormous variety but all of them rely on the same 
instinctive mechanisms. In the case of disgust, this mechanism is related to the idea of a polluting 
substance, what explains that the feeling of disgust is independent of the amount of contact or 
how much the substance is diluted. 
Applications of the recruitment of instincts for higher ends abound. We have seen above how 
our drive for fairness triggers retaliation ex post and elicits cooperation ex ante. Many religions 
rely on fear of a punishing God and some on love of God to motivate good deeds, and feelings of 
shame and guilt are present in most correctional institutions. In general, different emotions seem 
to be active in different kinds of enforcement mechanisms.  
VI.B. Institutions as complements of human nature 
Filling the adaptation gap between our ancestral and current environments requires us to 
manage our instincts on both the rationality and cooperation fronts. In terms of rationality, the  
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paramount issue is one of self-control, postponing gratification, while in terms of cooperation, it 
is fundamental to control antisocial behavior. Self-control means greater control of our emotions 
to improve our individual fitness; for example, instilling a lower subjective discount rate by 
education. Social control means controlling free riding. In a sense, it can be understood as a way 
of dealing only with cooperators. 
Institutions as enforcement 
Focusing on social control, institutions act as enforcement mechanisms which permit human 
groups to achieve greater cooperation within the group and makes them more competitive 
against other groups. Considering which of the exchange’s parties is acting as enforcer, three 
kinds of enforcement may be distinguished, and institutions play an important role in all of them.  
Under first party enforcement, it is the obliged party who acts as enforcer, relying for 
punishment on emotions like guilt and shame. To function properly, it requires previous 
indoctrination and selection of types before contracting. The role of institutions lies mainly in 
defining and indoctrinating a moral code, whose violation triggers innate guilt and shame 
emotions. On occasion, institutions are also involved in helping to enforce the moral code.13 In 
addition, this code may have very different properties and, therefore, facilitate different kinds of 
cooperation. For instance, Protestantism seems to promote values that support anonymous 
exchange while Catholicism is more hospitable to smaller communities (Arruñada, 2004). 
Second party enforcement is grounded on reciprocity, as the receiving party is the one who 
sanctions the defaults. Emotions triggering seemingly inefficient ex post retaliation act as 
important enforcement mechanisms, deterring cheating in anticipation of retaliation. A key 
activity is the correct evaluation of performance to avoid unjustified retaliation. Understandably, 
evolution has dedicated specialized mental resources to provide us with innate cheating 
detectors. The role of modern institutions, however, is often to channel or impede private 
retaliation. For example, criminal law punishes retaliation and rules and courts restrain 
asymmetric relational contracting.  
                                                 
13 Sometimes, institutions also help the individual to enforce the code, as it happens in Catholic 
oral confession (Arruñada, 2007).  
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Within third party enforcement, other persons act as enforcers. It can be informal and 
decentralized, as in the functioning of a commercial market or a social network, or highly formal 
and centralized, as in judicial procedures. Decentralized enforcement relies on different forms of 
reputational investments and gossip, including at present the activity of the mass media. 
Centralized enforcement relies on litigation and accumulation of sentences. It suffers the same 
problem as any other specialization: positive transaction costs, given that third party enforcers, as 
any other specialist, may pursue their own interests to the detriment of the underlying 
transactions. 
VII. Where are we humans heading? 
Analyses of human behavior that point out the presence of innate traits used to be wrongly 
read as genetic determinism, as prevalence of nature over nurture. This should not happen with 
modern cognition science, because it surpass this controversy on the relative importance of 
nature and nurture on behavior by emphasizing that both, nature and nurture, interact in a way 
that makes them not separable. They act as complements more than as substitutes. For example, 
children learn to speak different languages by growing up in different environments, but they 
learn by using a highly developed innate learning mechanism that includes most structural 
grammar, what explains why they learn to speak so fast and suddenly, almost exploding to speak 
between two and three years of age (Pinker, 1994; Baker, 2001).  
The interaction also takes place at the institutional level. The previous analysis of the 
adaptive role of institutions should help us in avoiding the mistake of genetic determinism 
because institutions interact with our instinctive traits, both recruiting them and complementing 
them. Institutions mold the nurturing process and display a full array of enforcement mechanisms 
that greatly affect our self and social control abilities. And institutions are the product of 
intentional design, relying on instincts, as explained above, but intentionally designed. This 
might reduce the influence of genetic selection, sitting human beings at the wheel of their 
destiny.  
We now interact technologically with our nature, as we have greater control over it: we 
achieve the pleasures that nature used to drive our behavior without incurring the costs of such  
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behaviors: contraceptives allow us to have sex without producing children; saccharine satisfies 
our sweet teeth without obesity; and so on.  
More importantly, institutions allow greater human interaction, enhancing specialization and 
multiplying our productivity. Institutional enforcement not only boosts within-group cooperation 
by punishing free riders but also enlarges the cooperative group. For instance, the rule of law 
makes trade with strangers much easier. It also channels between-group conflict to productive 
ends, by precluding violence, as it happens, for instance, in market competition between firms, 
ending up with multiple levels of cooperative groups. 
Furthermore, the process of institutional change is different from natural selection. It is 
constrained by the genetic background, but is substantially influenced by learning, decision-
making and imitation. Interbreeding is also possible, triggering processes similar to contagion 
and infection. To some extent, acquired behavioral features may also be transmitted from one 
generation to the next.14  
Institutional change is also intentional, the consequence of individual decisions.15 Intentional 
does not necessarily mean successful, however. We develop technologies only to be surprised by 
their unintended consequences, and our abilities at institutional design are probably even lower. 
Therefore, even if we are now at the wheel of our destiny, we are barely learning to drive it.  
                                                 
14 It is therefore, Lamarckian. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck argued at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century that traits acquired by an organism on to its progeny. For example, the long neck of the 
giraffe would result from generations of animals stretching to reach the highest leaves.  
15 Analyzing how are institutions designed would exceed the proper scope of this work, as it 
would make necessary going into the many theories of cultural evolution. See, for instance, 
Dawkins (1976, 1982), Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Sperber (1996).  
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